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1 Introduction 
While traditionally foreign direct investment (FDI) flowed from advanced developed 
economies into developed and developing countries, more recently, a new trend has 
emerged in the pattern of FDI. Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from emerging 
economies has begun to increase significantly and has been growing at a faster pace than 
FDI from the advanced developed world. Increasingly, multinational corporations 
(MNCs) from emerging economies are buying business assets and capabilities in the 
luxury sector all over Europe. These MNCs from emerging economies (EMNCs or 
EMNEs) have been the subject of recent interest, seen in a growing number of studies 
(Guillen and García-Canal, 2012; Kale and Singh, 2012; Williamson et al., 2013). 
According to Marchand (2015), two elements can explain this interest. First, the scope 
and pace of the international expansion by emerging economy firms has been 
exceptional. Second, the patterns of international expansion by emerging economy firms 
have raised questions about their originality and whether existing theories of international 
expansion strategies are adequate or need to be modified (Vecchi, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 
2014b; Vecchi and Brennan, 2014). 
The international expansion of emerging economy firms is particularly relevant to 
Italy and its manufacturing luxury sector. Italy has a traditional competitive advantage in 
the production of luxury products (Vecchi, 2008, 2013a, 2013b). The Italian luxury 
market has long been regarded as the origin of mainstream luxury goods and includes 
firms like Ferragamo, Prada, Gucci just to name a few. With a rich cultural heritage 
embedded within their brands, these Italian firms have captured loyal customers and 
remarkable profits from all over the world. In Italy, luxury firms are deeply rooted in 
their design, quality, artisanship and service and it has often taken decades to build their 
reputation. These features often appeal to the Chinese investors. 
This paper presents a cross-case analysis based on case-studies of two Chinese 
acquisitions to provide some in-depth insights into the influences and the motives driving 
Chinese firms to invest beyond their borders and in particular into the Italian luxury 
manufacturing sector. Both cases explore the patterns and the modes of Chinese 
acquisitions as well as the distinctive challenges that both the Chinese investors and the 
acquired Italian firms inevitably have to face. The paper comprises six sections. The first 
section provides an introduction covering the background of the research and outlines its 
rationale. While the second section reviews the relevant literature, the third section 
provides a description of the methodology. The fourth and the fifth sections present the 
two case-studies and the cross-case analysis respectively. The original contributions of 
the research and directions for further research are discussed in the concluding section of 
the paper. 
1.1 OFDI from emerging countries 
The Chinese acquisitions affecting the Italian manufacturing sector are emblematic of a 
wider trend. Many emerging economies have benefited from a massive infusion of 
capital, technology and managerial expertise from the traditional industrialised countries 
(Rios-Morales and Brennan, 2010). Because of this and other factors, firms in some of 
these countries have amassed sufficient capital, knowledge and know-how to invest 
abroad on their own. The proportion of FDI accounted for by NICs is increasing. A 
variety of reasons has been offered for the emergence of FDI from NICs (Rios-Morales 
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and Brennan, 2010). These include the support of exports, the expansion of market 
presence, the acquisition of established brands and foreign skills and the establishment 
and strengthening of local distribution networks. The increasing financial strength and the 
growing international exposure of companies from NICs together with greater domestic 
competition have also been suggested as explanations. Finally, the goals of building 
international brands, accessing advanced technologies and establishing R&D centres in 
developed countries help to explain this growing trend. 
The surge of FDI in recent years has generated a growing body of literature on FDI 
with the theory of internationalisation and the eclectic paradigm widely utilised. The 
theory affirms that the extent and pattern of international production undertaken by 
MNCs is determined by the interaction of three sets of interdependent variables: 
ownership, localisation and internalisation advantages, resulting in the abbreviation and 
alternative name of the eclectic paradigm, namely the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 2006). 
The first competitive advantage represents the ownership (O) of specific resources to be 
exploited externally. The second element of the OLI paradigm regards the host country 
location attractiveness (L). Rugman (1981) defines the L-advantage as the country 
specific advantage (CSA) that is unique to the business in each country. With regard to 
the last variable of the paradigm, the internalisation (I) advantages involve the 
opportunity to keep firm specific resources within the company rather than to exploit 
them in the market through arm’s length transactions (Amighini et al., 2010). The OLI 
variables explain why internationalisation occurs but do not identify the process of 
internationalisation. Thus, the eclectic paradigm has been subsequently extended to 
include the theory of the investment development path (IDP) that was first put forward in 
1975 and since then it has gone through various iterations (Dunning, 1981, 2006; 
Dunning and Narula, 1996). According to this theory, companies engage in FDI not only 
to exploit their existing O-advantage in a host location, but also to augment the 
advantages by acquiring complementary assets or new markets (Dunning, 2006). Both 
theories identify the institutional environment as one key factors for internationalisation, 
however, the focus is generally on the recipient country only. 
1.2 OFDI from China: acquisitions’ strategic drivers, post-acquisition 
challenges and integration strategies 
In the context of MNCs from NICs, China represents one of the leading players ranked 
5th among all economies in terms of OFDI flows (UNCTAD, 2011). While China’s 
dominant position as a recipient of global FDI flows has been well documented, the 
overseas investment activities of Chinese companies have received considerably less 
attention. However, a recent wave of cross-border acquisitions by Chinese firms has 
brought increased interest to this topic. In this age of financial crisis and austerity, an 
increasing number of European luxury companies are seeking financial support and 
alliances with wealthy companies. The result is that Europe is experiencing a structural 
wave of Chinese MNCs acquisitions where annual inflows tripled from 2006 to 2009, and 
tripled again by 2011 to €10 billion for 2012 (Rhodium Group, 2012). This phenomenon 
is rising some concerns. According to Meunier (2012, p.iii) in a recent briefing to the 
European Parliament, 
“Chinese OFDI may come with implicit strings attached and could potentially 
act as a Trojan Horse affecting European norms and policies, from human 
rights to labor laws. The surge of Chinese investment could also potentially 
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affect European institutional processes, exerting both centrifugal and 
centripetal pressures on European integration”. 
As such, to the purpose of this research it is useful to identify the distinctive strategic 
drivers of the acquisitions, their post-acquisition benefits and challenges as well as the 
integration strategies as they have been identified by the existing literature on the subject. 
1.2.1 Strategic drivers 
In terms of strategic drivers, Mathews (2002) has developed a theoretical framework 
called linkage, leverage and learning (LLL) to analyse the phenomenon of the MNEs 
from the Asia-Pacific region – the ‘dragon multinationals’. The framework captures the 
idea that latecomers use their overseas investments and global linkages to leverage their 
cost advantages, and learn about new sources of competitive gains. Differently from the 
OLI perspective, Mathews sees the first phase of MNEs formation as most likely to begin 
with asset-exploring purposes rather than asset-exploiting motives. He argues that linking 
with mature market MNCs, a latecomer firm may leverage knowledge, technology and 
market access with the result of entering in a learning process, which can be then 
exploited for further growth (Mathews, 2006). 
Child and Rodrigues (2005) examine the patterns of, and motives for, 
internationalisation by prominent market-seeking Chinese firms. Case-studies of these 
firms indicate that they are seeking technological and brand assets to create a competitive 
position in international markets. While mainstream theory tends to assume that firms 
internationalise to exploit competitive advantages, Chinese firms are generally making 
such investments in order to address competitive disadvantages. 
Luo and Tung (2007) present a more exhaustive springboard perspective to describe 
the internationalisation of emerging market multinationals that engage in international 
expansion as a springboard to acquire strategic resources and reduce their institutional 
and market constraints in their domestic market. Six drivers for the international 
expansion of emerging market firms are identified by Luo and Tung (2007). First, 
emerging market firms are keen to acquire technology and brands through 
internationalisation to overcome their lack of resources. Foreign firms’ willingness to sell 
or share their technology, know-how or brands due to financial exigency or restructuring 
needs enable them to fulfil this void. Second, emerging market firms use international 
expansion as a springboard to overcome their latecomer disadvantage. For instance, 
through some path-independent and proactive steps, such as mergers and acquisitions and 
strategic asset-seeking from advanced markets, ‘springboard’ moves allow emerging 
market firms to alleviate some latecomer or newcomer deficiencies in areas such as 
consumer base, brand recognition as well as technological leadership. Third, emerging 
market firms use international expansion as a springboard to overcome global rivals’ 
major foothold in their home country market. To most emerging market firms, their home 
country markets are still their main market of operation. However, these markets have 
been increasingly penetrated and even dominated by advanced market firms. To become 
global or transnational, some emerging market firms acknowledge that they must directly 
serve and win consumers in key foreign markets such as Europe, the USA, and Japan. 
Fourth, emerging market firms use outward investment as a springboard to bypass trade 
barriers such as quota restrictions, anti-dumping measures and special tariff penalties. 
Fifth, emerging market firms use international expansion as a springboard to mitigate 
domestic institutional constraints. Institutional voids such as lack of legal protection for 
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property rights, poor enforcement of commercial laws, non-transparent judicial and 
litigation systems, underdeveloped factor markets, inefficient market intermediaries and 
political hazards in their domestic market undermine the competitiveness of these firms, 
thus propelling them to go global. Sixth, emerging market firms use international 
expansion as a springboard to secure preferential treatment offered by emerging market 
governments. They do so mainly through reverse investments. Lastly, emerging market 
firms use international expansion as a springboard to leverage their competitive 
advantages in other emerging or developing markets. 
Rui and Yip (2008) suggest that Chinese firms strategically use cross-border 
acquisitions to achieve goals, such as acquiring strategic capabilities to offset their 
competitive disadvantages and leveraging their unique ownership advantages, while 
making use of institutional incentives and minimising institutional constraints. 
1.2.2 Post-acquisition benefits and challenges 
According to the LLL model, the degree of international success is related to the extent to 
which links can be established and resources can be leveraged. The potential advantage is 
related to the accessibility to these resources in terms of their inimitability, transferability 
or substitutability. The benefits depend both on the ability of the firms to leverage 
external resources and on their ‘absorptive capacity’ that is their ability to identify, 
assimilate and exploit external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Barkema et al. (1996) in particular, found that firms face cultural adjustment costs, 
especially when they engage in ‘double layered acculturation’ such as in the cases of 
acquisitions. However, the authors show that internationalising firms can move down the 
learning curve in such acquisitions, especially when they choose their expansion path so 
that they can exploit previous experience in the same country or in other countries with 
similar cultural characteristics. On the contrary, Morosini et al. (1998) outline that 
national cultural distance enhances cross-border acquisition performance by providing 
access to the target’s and/or the acquirer’s set of routines and repertoires embedded in 
national culture. Within the context of Chinese acquisitions, Björkman et al. (2007) 
propose that cultural differences can be both an asset and a liability – they can be 
beneficial as they may enhance potential synergies, but they can also create obstacles to 
fully reaping the benefits of the acquisition by exacerbating social integration problems 
and thus diminishing the acquiring and acquired firms’ capacity to mutually absorb 
capabilities from each other. 
Luo and Tung (2007) argue that when undertaking international expansion, emerging 
market MNEs face some distinctive challenges including of their poor corporate 
governance, the need to manage and integrate their rapidly expanding international 
footprint, their lack of global experience, and their weak product/process innovation 
capabilities. 
Williamson and Anand (2013) show how Chinese firms can upgrade by acquiring 
advanced economy firms and by assimilating their capabilities. Studies frequently claim 
that acquiring advanced or higher order capabilities such as innovation capability is a 
motivation for Chinese firm acquisitions (Deng, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007). The 
evidence on acquisitions of advanced economy targets enabling Chinese firms to upgrade 
their capabilities however is very limited and is anecdotal or case based. Case-studies 
show that many acquisitions of advanced economy firms have failed (Williamson and 
Anand, 2013). Some studies find anecdotal evidence of Chinese firms upgrading their 
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production capabilities aided by their acquisitions of advanced economy firms 
(Ramamurti and Singh, 2009; Williamson and Anand, 2013). There is however no 
evidence of innovation capability upgrading. Although Chinese firms do indeed obtain 
patents and technological products of target firms, what Williamson and Anand (2013, 
p.276) call ‘hard technology and intellectual property’ through acquisitions, gaining 
ownership of existing patents and products is not the same as gaining the capability to 
innovate new-to-the-world products and processes (Chari, 2015). 
According to Brennan (2015), the greatest challenge facing Chinese acquisitions in 
Europe is adjusting their style of organising and of managing their operations from their 
traditional hierarchical mode of organisation, as well as the command-and-control based 
approach to management, to one that is more compatible with the more autonomous work 
culture prevalent in Europe. Chinese acquirers that tend to be more successful in Europe 
have largely adopted a hands-off approach to the acquired entity; those that have not 
adjusted their style of management tend to face challenges, such as the loss of key human 
capital, as well as related reputational capital. Navigating the very different cultural and 
institutional environment in Europe and operating according to local norms and practices 
requires preparation and training for Chinese managers. An additional challenge for 
Chinese investors in Europe relates to their need to develop their absorptive capacities if 
they are to fully reap the benefits from the know-how and capabilities of the acquired 
entities. 
1.2.3 Integration strategies 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) consider that the success of an acquisition strongly 
depends on the successful integration of the two organisations following the acquisition, 
with the choice of integration type being based on two essential criteria: the 
interdependence between the entities, and the target’s need for organisational autonomy. 
Combining these two criteria helps to identify a number of ideal-typical integration 
modes. The first one is absorption, which is intended to quickly align the target’s 
strategies and practices with the acquirer’s and results in significant changes in the 
structure and the systems of the target. The second approach is preservation, which 
allows the target’s strategies and organisation to be maintained, since changes are 
restricted to an absolute minimum. In practice, there is a continuum between absorption 
and preservation, more than a binary choice between two distinct categories. The third 
approach is symbiosis, which aims for the target and the acquirer to learn from each other 
and share their qualities. 
As for the integration strategies implemented by Chinese firms, Child and Rodriguez 
(2005) show that the apparent preference of Chinese firms when investing abroad to rely 
on acquisitions and organic growth rather than joint ventures with non-Chinese MNCs 
suggests that they may prefer to retain their distinctive administrative heritage. Fortanier 
and Van Tulder (2008) compare the pattern of international expansion of large firms from 
China with those from developed countries. They find that Chinese firms have 
internationalised more rapidly and more recently and tend to present a more volatile 
trajectory of internationalisation vis-à-vis those in developed countries. 
Deng (2009) argues that Chinese firms possess firm-specific assets that give them 
competitive advantages at home and seek complementary strategic assets that are more 
advanced through their acquisitions abroad. The partnering approach to post-acquisition 
integration helps secure these strategic assets by giving autonomy to the target firm’s 
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management team, retaining talents and creating synergy. Similarly, Kale and Singh 
(2012) assume that Chinese firms would prefer to develop an integration approach based 
on partnering, characterised by a high level of autonomy left to the acquired entities and a 
selective coordination of activities with the acquirer. This partnering approach developed 
by Chinese firms is likely to change over time. As they become more and more 
experienced, Chinese firms may develop more interventionist approaches. 
In similar fashion, according to Marchand (2015) ‘classical’ MNEs from developed 
countries usually develop an absorption type of integration, whereas Chinese firms use 
mainly the partnering approach: they would not absorb their acquisitions, rather 
collaborating with them. The partnering integration mode, which is close to a strategic 
alliance, would be, if not completely distinctive, at least a recurring feature of Chinese 
firms and manifests itself through several features: structural separation of the acquired 
entity, selective coordination of activities between the two entities, few replacements of 
the target’s resources (management team, brands), high organisational autonomy left to 
the target, and a gradual integration speed. 
2 Chinese acquisitions in the Italian manufacturing sector 
The scenario of Italy and China is particularly interesting due to the peculiarity of the 
Italian economic system which shares some features with the Chinese one. These are 
namely the strong presence of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are 
specialised in traditional manufacturing industries (Rabellotti and Sanfilippo, 2008; 
Amighini et al., 2010). A recent study (Pietrobelli et al., 2010) shows that Chinese firms 
often regard Italy as a particularly informative European market since the consumers’ 
taste is often perceived as being very demanding and very sophisticated. Moreover, in 
mainland China, Italy’s reputation for high quality and premium products remains strong 
and the market for luxury goods has experienced remarkable growth (The Economist, 
2012). According to Filippov and Saebi (2008), Chinese investments in Italy reflect the 
effort to enter competitive European markets and obtain access to superior technologies, 
know-how and capabilities. The high level of specialisation in sectors such as the 
automotive, textile and clothing, machinery and home appliances represents a very 
appealing factor for China wishing to upgrade its production and technological 
capabilities and build its own global champions in these industries (Mariotti and 
Mutinelli, 2009). 
According to a report from the Rhodium Group (2012), the first Chinese investment 
in Italy was in 1986 when Air China opened a commercial office in Rome and until the 
end of the 1990s the number of investments from China was negligible. However, since 
2000 the number of Chinese acquisitions in Italy has increased significantly as a 
confirmation of the importance of the strategic asset seeking motivation. Pietrobelli et al. 
(2010) affirm that what is happening today in Italy resembles the ‘Marco Polo effect’ that 
happened in China centuries ago but in the opposite direction. At that time, Marco Polo 
was impressed by the level of civilisation achieved in China and brought back to Italy 
some important scientific and technological discoveries. The same is happening today, 
since Chinese companies seem to be interested in gaining the knowledge and the 
expertise developed in Italy, in particular in design-intensive and in high-quality 
production. For these reasons, Chinese MNEs are increasingly targeting the acquisition of 
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technological skills, design capabilities and brands that are available in the Italian 
specialised manufacturing clusters (Pietrobelli et al., 2010) as illustrated in Table 1. 
Table 1 Main Acquisitions by Chinese firms in Italy by sector 
Year Target Acquirer Sector Stake % 
2001 Meneghetti Haier White goods 100 
2004 Wilson Wenzhou Hazan Textile 90 
2005 Benelli Qianjiang Ltd Motorbikes (luxury) 100 
2006 Elios Feidiao Electrics White goods NA 
2007 HPM Europe Spa Hunan Sunward Intelligent Machinery Machinery 51 
2007 Omas srl Xynyu Hengdeli Holdings Textile 90 
2008 Cifa Changsha Zoomlion White goods 60 
2008 Tacchini Group Hembling International  
Holdings Limited 
Fashion (luxury) 100 
2009 Elba Haier White goods 20 
2010 Volvo Italia Zhejiang Geely Holding Automotive NA 
2011 Sirton Shanghai First Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceutical NA 
2012 Ferretti Group Shandong Heavy  
Industries-Weichai Group 
Boats (luxury) 75 
2012 De Tomaso Hotyork Group Automotive (luxury) 80 
2012 Miss Sixty Crescent Hyde Park Fashion (luxury) 50 
2012 Ferragamo Peter Woo Fashion (luxury) 8 
Source: Data collected by the author 
Rather than building home-grown brands that would require a long time to become 
established, Chinese firms seek to invest in Italian brands that possess a rich heritage but 
have fallen on hard times or gone out of fashion to consolidate their position in the global 
market. An emblematic example is the acquisition of Omas, a company specialised in the 
production of luxury fountain pens since 1925, which was acquired in 2007 by the group 
Xinyu Hengdeli Holdings. Other cases are the Hembly International Holdings, a leading 
Asian clothing retailing group that acquired Sergio Tacchini, a well-known but declined 
luxury clothing brand in 2007 and Trendy International, a Hong Kong clothing distributor 
who recently bought a minority stake in Miss Sixty, a popular luxury clothing 
manufacturer for teens. Overall, the widespread anxiety concerning China’s international 
expansion calls for a better understanding and knowledge of the strategies of Chinese 
companies entering the Italian market to better inform what is becoming an increasingly 
important debate. Although this topic is becoming fashionable in international business 
studies, the empirical evidence on Chinese FDI in European countries is quite limited and 
mainly relates to the UK (Burghart and Rossi, 2009; Cross and Voss, 2008; Liu and Tian, 
2008) and Germany (Schuller and Turner, 2005). This evidence is even scarcer if we 
consider Italy and to large extent the luxury manufacturing sector. 
An exception to this lack of evidence is a study conducted by Spigarelli et al. (2013). 
Spigarelli et al. (2013) illustrate how Chinese companies use Italy to access Western 
markets (and strategic logistical services), as well as a wide range of distinct 
skills/intangible assets, such as brands, know-how and technology, particularly in the 
manufacturing industries. The findings suggest that while superficial product portfolio 
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and cost benefits can accrue due to the acquisition, cultural and administrative differences 
and lack of synergies between the two companies prevented the acquirer from fully 
integrating the intangible assets, particularly human resource talent, of the acquired firm. 
Given such limited evidence, there is a valuable opportunity to conduct further research. 
3 Methodology 
This paper presents the results of two case-studies of Chinese acquisitions that were 
conducted to provide some in-depth insights into the influences and the motives driving 
these firms to invest into the Italian manufacturing sector. The paper relies on two  
in-depth case-studies (Yin, 2008) that were purposefully chosen to illustrate some 
distinctive organisational challenges that were faced by both the target and the acquirer 
firms before, during and after the acquisition. The acquisitions of Meneghetti by Haier 
and of Idra Srl by LK Technology Holdings Ltd were selected as suitable case-studies. 
Both manufacturing firms were acquired by Chinese investors in 2001 and in 2008 
respectively. Both Italian firms operate in a niche manufacturing sector and they both 
enjoy a long history and tradition and can be considered as being representative of the 
manufacturing luxury sector due to their design-intensive nature and the premium quality 
of their products. 
To increase comparability and confidence in the findings, the two case-studies 
followed a structured research protocol as illustrated in Table 2. Apart from secondary 
research in the form of media reports and company documentation, primary research was 
carried out via interviews. These in depth interviews were conducted with two top 
executives and with a range of other six key informants who were knowledgeable about 
the acquisitions. 
Table 2 Case-study research protocol 






interview with Idra 
Financial Controller 
Overview of the target’s market Overview of the acquirer’s market 
Brief history of the target Brief history of the acquirer 
Target’s main strategic assets Acquirer’s main strategic assets 
 Acquirer’s international expansion 
The acquisition 
The post-acquisition 
The integration phase 
Six in-depth 
interviews with  
key-informants 
Discussion of the findings to increase their robustness 
First, the General Manager of Meneghetti and the Financial Controller of Idra were 
interviewed to investigate some aspects of the acquisition that would not have emerged 
with other data collection methods. Both interviewees have been working in their 
respective companies for many years and played a crucial role before, during and after 
the acquisition. The interviewees also provided useful material such as financial reports 
of the companies along with other secondary data that were useful to corroborate the 
findings. Additionally, to overcome the limitations that conducting two purposefully 
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chosen case-studies entail (Yin, 1984), and to increase the robustness of the findings six 
key informants possessing relevant expertise in the field and knowledgeable about the 
acquisitions were also interviewed (Tellis, 1997). The data collected from the two main 
interviews and the interviews with the key-informants was cross-referenced with 
secondary data from company material (e.g. official press releases, companies’ bulletins, 
companies’ websites) for triangulation (Jick, 1979). 
4 The case-study: the acquisition of Meneghetti by Haier 
4.1 The target 
Founded in 1960, Meneghetti SpA is a family company producing domestic appliance 
components, such as cooking hobs and ovens, under third parties’ renowned brands. In 
the late ‘90s, the business was particularly committed to the production of the so-called 
‘mini-kitchen’. The mini-kitchen was meant as a compact self-contained kitchen 
designed to fit small spaces. The design included, in addition to the structure, built-in 
cooking hobs, an oven and a small refrigerator. Since the in-house production was 
already covering the cooking hobs and the ovens, Mr. Meneghetti decided to start 
manufacturing the refrigerator unit as well. In the late ‘90s, he inaugurated a new 
refrigerator plant in Campodoro, near the city of Padua, not far from the original plant 
based in Rosà (in Vicenza). Unfortunately, later in the same year, Mr. Meneghetti, the 
charismatic innovator and leader of the company, passed away leaving the management 
to the heirs. In 2001, the Meneghetti family decided to retain the core business of the 
family and to sell the refrigerator plant in Campodoro to the Chinese Qingdao Haier Co., 
Ltd maintaining an 8% share ownership. The facility’s production capacity was 250,000 
units per years and at the time, the facility employed 100 people (Yi and Ye, 2003). 
4.2 The acquirer 
Qingdao Haier Co., Ltd. is a company specialised in manufacturing and distributing 
household appliances and consumer electronics goods. Based in Qingdao, China, it 
currently owns 24 manufacturing centres, 21 industrial parks, and five R&D centres in 
Europe, North America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Controlled with a share 
holding of 45.9% by Haier Group Corporation, a privately held company characterised by 
large state-owned stakes, Qingdao Haier Co., Ltd. has been listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange since 1999. Recently it gained recognition as one of the best publicly traded 
companies in Forbes Asia Fab 50 and as the world’s number one major appliances 
manufacturer, with a 9.7% of retail volume share. The company in 2013 was also ranked 
eighth in the Top 50 Most Innovative Global Enterprises and ranked first for Consumer 
Products and Retail by the Boston Consulting Group. Originally named Qingdao 
Refrigerator Co., Ltd., Haier was founded in 1984. As happened to many Chinese 
companies, Haier business growth and development has been shaped by Chinese 
historical and political milestones of the post-Mao era. Starting from 1979, when the 
Chinese economy officially welcomed foreign investments through the introduction of 
the first law on Sino-foreign equity joint ventures, until 1984, when policy reforms 
appointed 14 coastal cities as open areas for foreign investments, reducing red tape and 
granting tax benefits. These were the circumstances that allowed the German company 
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Liebherr to sign a joint-venture contract with Qingdao Refrigerator Co. in 1985. 
Throughout this alliance the company, whose name changed to Haier, acquired 
equipment and technology know-how from the German counterpart managing to boost 
expansion within the national market. The use of a shared trademark was a great help to 
win market share since the foreign brand reputation conveyed an idea of prestige and 
quality to the Chinese customers (Yi and Ye, 2003). By the end of the ‘90s, the Chinese 
market for refrigerators was incredibly promising and fast growing. Social acceptance of 
private property and increases in per-capita incomes were the main drivers of household 
appliance sales in China. The refrigerator was the first electrical appliance that a family 
wanted to own and the symbol of a whole new revolution – not just a status symbol but 
the appliance that changed the traditional way of storing and consuming food and 
beverage. During this phase, with a net profit of USD 20mil, 50,000 employees and the 
undisputed leadership in the national market, Haier started to pursue a differentiation 
strategy and aggressively expand internationally. The decision to internationalise was 
mainly to maintain high growth in the wake of growing competition from foreign firms 
and to comply with Government directives of the ‘Go Out Policy’ (11th five-year plans 
of the People’s Republic of China). Haier’s aim was to become a truly global player, by 
increasing its market shares and by building a worldwide brand. To fulfil this goal, the 
initial strategy adopted was to first penetrate the difficult markets and later on focus on 
the easier ones. The most challenging and profitable markets were the USA and the 
European ones. Committed to this effort, the company was called to strengthen skills, 
competencies and above all sustain massive capital investments. In the USA, Haier 
entered the market first through a joint venture with Michael Jemal and then through a 
greenfield investment in South Carolina, where a production facility was opened. In 
addition, a marketing centre in New York and a research and development hub in Boston 
were established. In Europe, on the other hand, the circumstances were far more 
complicated. On the one hand, European customers had always been generally 
considered quite sophisticated and, most importantly, the market was extremely 
fragmented - a product appealing to the British taste possibly did not appeal to the 
Spanish. Therefore, gaining success in the European market meant that Haier needed 
what it takes to win the global market. The development of the European strategy started 
with an initial joint venture with Philips in Netherlands and later on through acquisitions 
and the establishment of commercial outposts in all the major markets (e.g. France, the 
UK, Spain, Germany, Poland, Greece, Russia). Nowadays, Haier’s production strategy is 
blended. Part of its manufacturing is made in China and part of it is localised in local 
markets. In Europe, for instance, Haier established design centres, a manufacturing 
facility and regional commercial centres. The regional commercial centres are under the 
control of Haier Europe Trading, the European commercial branch of Qingdao Haier Co., 
Ltd., which is headquartered in Paris. The rationale of this blended strategy is to establish 
a “locally designed, locally made and locally sold” system that allows Haier to acquire 
the latest information and understand the changes in local customers’ demands (Kumar 
and Steenkamp, 2013). In addition to the capability of quick reactions to market changes, 
producing locally allows Haier to put ‘made in the US’ or ‘made in Italy’ labels, avoiding 
in this way the customer perception of low quality exports from China. Haier products 
are sold through most major retail chains. Considering the refrigerator business, Haier 
pursues a differentiation strategy in China and in the USA through the Casarte brand, 
targeting high margin price segments, whereas in Europe and in Italy the products are 
targeted to medium margin price segments like the ones from the main competitors such 
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as Candy, Merloni and Indesit. However, brands such as Borsch, Liebhers and Siemens 
are still preferred by European consumers due to a strong preference towards European 
brands. The latter issue has posed one of the biggest challenges for Haier – build 
satisfactory products for customers getting more and more sophisticated and at the same 
time overcome the drawbacks linked to common prejudices and misconceptions over 
Chinese brands. 
4.3 The acquisition 
Having decided to go global, Haier’s first strategy to approach the European market was 
to send sales representatives knocking the office doors of the most important retailers 
(e.g. Carrefour, Conforama, El Corte Inglés, Kingfisher) to introduce and place their 
products. According to the General Manager of Meneghetti, the approach was not very 
effective. Sales representatives were not fluent in English, the catalogues were most of 
the time in Chinese and the product itself unappealing to the European taste. The 
refrigerators that were selling so well in China and that were reporting fair success in the 
USA were almost impossible to place in the European market because they were 
considered ‘ugly’ (interview with the General Manager). In addition, the label ‘made in 
China’ was creating the wrong expectations – the product was supposed to be extremely 
cheap and only adequately functional. It was during this phase that Haier was approached 
by Mares Marketing. Mares, a company based in Varese, specialised in offering sales and 
marketing services to manufacturers of domestic appliances in need of expertise to 
develop their sales network in the European market. In early 2000s, it was the founder 
manager of Mares Marketing that put in contact the heirs of the late Meneghetti and the 
Haier managers to promote the acquisition of the refrigerator plant in Campodoro. In July 
2001, the official announcement was released: Qingdao Haier Co. purchased the Italian 
refrigerator plant belonging to Meneghetti spa, based in Campodoro, for USD 8 million. 
The new-born entity was named Haier (Italy) Appliances. The acquisition was meant to 
mark a turning point in Haier expansion. The inaugural celebration was delivered in 
Chinese style. Haier management explained the mission and the vision for the future, the 
traditional ribbon was cut, Italian and Chinese flags were waved in the air. In the 
meanwhile, all employees listened carefully somehow astonished by the nationality of the 
ownership but mainly relived that the future now appeared less uncertain. However, 
Haier’s euphoria for the conclusion of the first European acquisition rapidly burnt out 
when the deal revealed itself not to be as good as expected. The facilities were surely new 
but the refrigerator production had never been properly launched, therefore since the 
customer portfolio was without any orders there was a clear production overcapacity. The 
Chinese management team sent to Italy consisted of just one production director and an 
interpreter (interview with the General Manager). 
4.4 The post-acquisition 
At the beginning, the difficulties were several. Irregular production orders, 
incommunicability between managers and workers, and finally chaos generated by the 
whole ‘cassa integrazione’ situation. ‘Cassa integrazione’ is a sort of an unemployment 
insurance that companies facing financial difficulties can resort to. It means that for a 
fixed number of days in a year workers do not come to work but are still paid by the 
company for these working days lost. In so doing, the company still saves money by 
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making reduced payments towards National Insurance and Stamp contributions and still 
guarantees employment and workers’ rights. From the Chinese standpoint it was 
unbelievable that workers were to be paid for not working and staying home, the Chinese 
managers did prefer to keep them in the factory even if there was no production. From 
2001 to 2003, nothing relevant happened in the Italian subsidiary. Haier kept expanding 
in Europe through the opening of regional commercial centres, each one independent 
from the others, with their own product manager, accounting and logistics departments 
and one production director to achieve the budget. The headquarter for the Haier 
European commercial area was located in Paris. In Italy, the regional centre was 
originally based in Varese and later on in Milan. In the meantime, the Campodoro facility 
was only marginally involved in the greater strategy. According to the General Manager, 
at that time the plant was seen more as a burden than a resource to be exploited 
(interview with the General Manager). Things started to change by the end of 2003. The 
Qingdao management realised that the Italian plant could be used as a regional 
observatory to observe the market, the product itself, the competitors’ price dynamics, the 
suppliers’ networks and all the production information that were not usually available 
through the commercial salesmen. The responsibility to supervise the plant was given to 
the General Manager of Meneghetti, a very reputable Italian manager with extensive 
experience in the sector having previously worked extensively in Zanussi, Electrolux and 
Whirlpool. When considering Haier’s acquisition of Meneghetti, it can be said that from 
2001 to 2004, the Chinese management of Haier Italy Appliances was more concerned 
with minimising the damages rather than proactively starting a proper post-acquisition 
strategy (interview with key-informant A). At that time, the production consisted of the 
assembly of a double-door refrigerator (with a refrigerator and a freezer integrated in the 
same appliance) of Chinese design that in Europe targeted the lower end of the market. 
The profit margins expected were almost impossible to achieve. Acquiring the relevant 
management expertise, in the person of the General Manager, was the first step made by 
Haier to change the status quo of the forgotten Italian plant. During the following four 
years, the Italian management (the General Manager and his team) and the Chinese chief 
engineer in Qingdao, the only one truly believing in the potential of the Campodoro plant, 
jointly conceived the product that marked the turning point for Haier’s expansion – the 
3D refrigerator. The product was totally designed from scratch for the European 
consumers, it was innovative from a technological standpoint, functional, and “beautiful 
to look at since its design was refined and sleek” (interview with the General Manager). 
Unsurprisingly, the 3D refrigerator became the Haier ambassador product in Europe, 
registering great success also in China, where the ‘made in Italy’ label greatly appealed to 
wealthy consumers. The Campodoro facility became the production centre of the new 
product. Even though Italian wages were costly by Chinese standards, the product was 
meant to target the high end of the market, therefore the profit margins were possible to 
achieve. In the Campodoro facility, the production line was modernised to match the 
needs of the new design, maximise process and product communalities and minimise 
process bottlenecks and inventory. In 2009, the Campodoro plant worked at its full 
capacity with a yearly production of 80–100,000 units (interview with the General 
Manager). The factory was not just an assembly facility, it purchased the painted foils 
and the manufacturing was entirely made in-house. Since the plant was relatively  
small – competitors had more than one production line and production of 1 million units 
per year, the economies of scale were more difficult to obtain. This provided the rationale 
for sourcing components from China where the prices were lower and where a further 
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discount could be obtained due to Haier’s bargaining power. As for decisions regarding 
annual production volumes, the Italian factory was subordinated directly to the Qingdao 
headquarters rather than the Haier Europe Trading branch. Haier Europe and Haier Italy 
had their own catalogue both selling products that were both manufactured by Haier Italy 
and some imported from Haier’s Chinese factories. The 3D refrigerator soon gained the 
status of a global product that gained the appreciation not only from Western countries 
but also in China, where it became surprisingly an overwhelming success (interview with 
the General Manager). Specifically for this product Haier created the brand ‘Casarte’ that 
recalled the idea of ‘Italian-ness’, luxury and the prestige of ‘Made in Italy’ products. 
Haier targeted wealthy Chinese, with a yearly income of over USD 1 million for the 
product, and priced the product at USD 100 higher than the price of similar products from 
the competitors. The product was well distributed and helped Haier gain remarkable 
visibility as a brand in Europe. Unlike other multinationals coming from emerging 
economies, Haier proudly owned manufacturing facilities in Italy and its products were 
authentic ‘made in Italy’ goods. Nowadays, the situation has slightly changed from the 
‘golden era’ that can be dated from 2008 to 2012 (interview with the General Manager). 
The original 3D product has not been radically innovated yet and its production is slightly 
decreasing. The European market still represents an obstacle to Haier since the path 
towards its quest has been much longer than just the first step made by acquiring the 
production facilities in Campodoro (interview with key-informant B). The drawbacks 
linked to the misguided perceptions of Chinese brands are still heavily influencing the 
purchasing of Haier refrigerators, as the General Manager confirms “when facing two 
options that are quite comparable among themselves, the consumer tends to stick with the 
European well-known brand rather than to opt for the Chinese one” (interview with the 
General Manager). 
4.5 The integration phase 
According to the General Manager, working in China and with the Chinese managers is 
“not a task for weak hearted” (interview with the General Manager). The main challenge 
during the integration phase concerns the fundamental differences between the Italian and 
the Chinese culture, not just at the organisational level but also at the national level. As it 
was explained by the General Manager 
“I was confused at first. I did not understand the Chinese culture and the way 
the Chinese managers behaved. Similarly, they had the same feelings about me. 
The turning point happened when I started learning more about their culture 
and to realize that it was impossible to keep doing business as I was used to. It 
was essential to recognize that I was not doing just business but I was doing 
business with the Chinese”. 
When considering Chinese business behaviour, it is quite difficult to identify which are 
its distinctive features, as it happens for the Japanese or German firms; however, it is 
possible to detect some distinctive traits since Chinese business behaviour tends to be 
heavily influenced by the Chinese national culture (interview with key-informant D). 
This was confirmed by the General Manager, for instance, when he mentioned the 
radically different attitudes towards the concept of time when approaching a project. In 
the Italian organisational culture, for instance, a Gantt chart is one of the most common 
tools used to plan the production timeline. The drawing of the Gantt chart and the 
planning involved are the initial steps, the initial phase when the manager or the team 
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identifies the adequate timeframe for the project completion, defines the milestones and 
the checkpoints, finds out the alternatives, the corrective plans and the possible shortcuts. 
Through this approach the aim is to face and solve the majority of the issues that are 
likely to happen during the project and to closely monitor its development from the 
beginning to its completion. Conversely, “the Chinese saw the Gantt chart not as the 
starting point but as the final one. Once the planning was executed the paper sheet was 
put away and forgotten” (interview with the General Manager). Moreover, the General 
Manager stated that the tool itself was somehow used to please the supervisor rather than 
to visualise the pattern toward the completion of the project. For instance, it often 
happened that the Gantt chart was started from the end going backwards, with the result 
that everything was apparently fitting even though the rationale behind the tool was 
completely missed. Also the notion of contract and negotiating is different, “I was used to 
the idea that when the contract was signed by both the parties that it was it, instead the 
Chinese approach allows for further negotiation and changes even once the contract has 
been signed” (interview with the General Manager). Pleasing the supervisors is another 
issue highlighted by the General Manager that sometimes leads to misunderstandings and 
organisational delays. 
“In China people will never say no. You have to understand when the denial is 
tacit. For instance, once, it happened that something was going wrong back in 
the Chinese facility and from the Italian office it was impossible to understand 
what the whole matter was about. Since the situation was murky, I decided to 
book a flight and go over myself. It was clear that my Chinese colleagues were 
not looking forward to my arrival but rather than just explicitly telling me not 
to come they made up excuses. First it was that the one I wanted to talk with 
was on a business trip in the US, then that he was free only on a particular hour, 
and lastly that the plant would have been closed in the days I was planning to 
visit to allow employees to attend the Olympic torch passage through the city. 
It was probably at that time that I finally had the definitive proof and I gave up: 
the Olympic torch official path was not going nearby Qingdao at all. The most 
exhilarating fact was that while in my office in Campodoro I was wondering 
together with my team what the Chinese were doing, at the same time in an 
office in Qingdao my colleague and his team were probably wondering why I 
was being so stubborn not to understand that it was a no and that I wasn’t 
welcome.” (interview with the General Manager) 
Similarly, the General Manager discovered that the importance of pleasing a guest 
sometimes could be misleading for communication. At the beginning of his experience in 
Haier, during the first meeting in China he was asked to give a talk to the Chinese 
colleagues. The room was filled up with 50 people and they were all listening carefully to 
what he had to say. However, he soon realised that no one understood a thing of what he 
was saying even if there were no complaints. From then on, he learnt to stop now and 
then and ask not only if they were following him but also if they were able to summarise 
the concepts just explained. In this way, he learnt how to improve his own speech 
delivery and to actually dialogue with colleagues. Language was not the only barrier to 
face during the integration phase. Communication as a whole is an essential issue when 
managing a business as wide as Haier’s (interview with key-informant C). Nowadays, 
technology allows people to work in offices as far away as 9,000 kilometres from one 
another without any trouble. However, within a Chinese organisation it is important to 
make yourself known in person to your peers and breach the circle of friendship, the so 
called guanxi (interview with the key-informant A). According to the General Manager’s 
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experience, the Italian management devoted substantial effort into relationship 
networking with the Qingdao colleagues in order to develop mutual trust. The General 
Manager’s trips to Qingdao were frequent and every time a gift from Italy was brought. 
However, building mutual trust and relationship is not enough to manage the relations 
within the organisation. Haier, in particularly, even though relatively young from a 
Western perspective, is quite a traditional business with a very hierarchic and 
bureaucratic organisation structure. There are too many management layers and the main 
consequence is that the decision process is extremely lengthy and time consuming. The 
leadership is overloaded and when called to decide, the decisions are inefficient due to 
lack of information and time. Moreover, the oppression at the top of the organisation is 
balanced by a paralysis at the periphery where managers have very little autonomy and 
no recognition for their good or bad actions. According to the General Manager, things 
are starting to change in Haier, thanks to the efforts of the current CEO. Chinese are very 
ambitious when setting a goal or an objective to achieve, however, most of the time what 
the management forwards is not a decision but a proclamation, a poster, a dazebao. This 
for example caused some confusion immediately after the acquisition of Meneghetti, 
when the Haier delegation in Campodoro announced investments and goals but then left 
the management of the facility to just one Chinese manager, who did not speak either 
English or Italian, without implementing any of the actions in the initial statement. The 
tendency for ambitious proclamations without due follow up actions was also evident in 
the reticence of the Chinese management to further invest in the marketing and the 
communication campaign. This was perceived as Haier’s lack of resolution to ultimately 
build a strong brand. When the General Manager was asked about it, he answered that 
Haier made significant investments in the European market, but due to delays, lengthy 
decisions and weak communications the 3D product came out a couple of years later than 
planned. “At that point, in Qingdao the success of the 3D product was experienced as 
something to exploit not as something to leverage in order to gain even more in the 
future” (interview with the General Manager). In addition, when it became necessary to 
renew and revamp the product, it was decided to commit the restyling to the Porsche 
Design Centre, without even considering any of the smaller independent designers who 
were probably more equipped and knowledgeable about the refrigerator market. In all 
these circumstances, the General Manager said that the Italian team tried to influence the 
decisions from the headquarters but it was extremely difficult due to the organisational 
approach of the Chinese counterpart. Decisions were made from the top managers and the 
involvement of the lower managers was not always welcomed. The same was confirmed 
by the General Manager who stated that initially his position within the company was not 
clearly defined, only later due to fortuitous circumstances and personal interests he 
became more involved in the design of the new 3D product and he gained recognition 
and credibility far above and ultimately appointed General Manager. 
Due to the 3D product success, the Italian facility became a flagship of Haier 
production in Italy. Qingdao headquarters requested some changes to make the Italian 
factory look “a little bit more Chinese” (interview with the General Manager). Now on 
the walls of the offices there are Chinese posters, a clock that gives the time in Italy and 
the time in China, the Haier poem and outside the building there are the Italian, the 
Chinese and the European flags. Interestingly, when asked whether the Italian culture was 
somehow absorbed by the Chinese, the General Manager affirmed that it was impossible. 
This is the reason why in the Campodoro facility the two cultures clearly coexist and 
gave birth to an integrated one (interview with the General Manager). Evident examples 
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are the Chinese posters on the corridor wall where the Mandarin text and its Italian 
translation are one next to each other. However, the translation is not a literal translation 
but one that is more apt to the Italian culture. 
“It would have been ridiculous to do otherwise. It was impossible to import the 
Chinese culture in our plant. However, a fundamental integration step was to 
take conscience of the peculiarities and the differences between our culture and 
theirs and make sure that everyone respect each other.” (interview with the 
General Manager) 
Table 3 summarises the acquisition of Meneghetti by Haier and its critical phases. 
Table 3 The acquisition of Meneghetti and its critical phases 
The acquisition At the time of the acquisition, aim of Haier was to penetrate the 
European market, one of the most challenging and profitable markets in 
the world. Following a greenfield investment in the USA, Haier realised 
that acquiring an already existing production plant in Europe could have 
been a more effective strategy. The Italian Meneghetti seemed a good 
choice at the time - the facility was located in the North of Italy, where 
there is strong tradition of white goods manufacturing, and the previous 
owners were willing to close the deal rapidly and at a convenient price. 
Owning a manufacturing plant in Italy would have allowed Haier to 
exploit the closeness to the target market, to better understand the 
European consumers’ taste, to gain an in-depth knowledge of the 
suppliers’ networks and competitors as well as to unveil strategic 
information that through commercial outposts were impossible to obtain. 
The post-acquisition During the first couple of years after the acquisition, the Italian plant was 
treated more like a nuisance than an asset. Things started to change once 
a new General Manager, with important previous experience in the white 
goods sector, was appointed. The Qingdao headquarters decided to 
invest heavily into the European market. A new 3D product was 
developed for the European customers thanks to the synergies 
established among the Italian plant and the Qingdao headquarters. The 
Italian plant was the only Haier’s manufacturing facility in Europe. In 
the Campodoro facility, new machineries were acquired and the 
production line was modified to accommodate the production of the new 
3D refrigerator. Components were sourced from China. Directives 
regarding production came directly from the Qingdao headquarters. 
Although the product experienced remarkable success in Europe, the 
drawbacks associated with a Chinese brand were still significant. 
Conversely, in emerging markets and mainly in the Chinese one, the 
‘Made in Italy’ tag on Haier refrigerators proved to be very successful. 
The integration 
phase 
In the transition period after the acquisition, the main issues among the 
Chinese management and the Italian facility emerged in terms of 
different working routines and lack of communications due to language 
barriers. Once the Italian General Manager was appointed, the cultural 
issues were only partially solved. Differences persisted in the context of 
organisational relationships and communication with the Chinese 
managers. Moreover, the Chinese firm was characterised by a very 
highly centralised approach to the decisional process. Strategies were 
slow to be implemented and there was a significant low level of 
autonomy at the periphery. Different attitudes towards working practices 
and project management tools caused delays and waste of resources in 
shared projects. A particular focus on efficiency and short-term results 
was noticed. 
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5 The case-study: the acquisition of Idra Srl by LK Technology Holdings 
Ltd 
5.1 The target 
Established in 1946 in Brescia, Italy, Idra srl is one of the world’s leading manufacturer 
of die-casting machines for aluminium and magnesium. In the last 68 years, it has 
designed, produced, customised and serviced more than 13,000 machines all around the 
world. In Europe and in the USA, Idra dominates the high end of the industry together 
with a few other European players such as Italpresse, Buhler and French. The market for 
Idra’s products is global and its customers are world renowned companies. For instance, 
when considering the automobile industry, the Ford Mondeo’s rear door is produced 
exclusively on Idra die-casting machines, as well as the dashboard structure of the BMW 
Mini. In the same industry, other high-profile customers are Benz, Audi and Fiat 
Chrysler. Throughout its long history, Idra’s know-how and brand name have remained 
consistent with the original vision of its founders despite formal changes in the 
company’s name (from Idra Presse SpA to Idra srl) and its owners (from Italian to 
Chinese) (interview with the key-informant E). In 2002 Idra Presse SpA, previously listed 
in the Milan Stock Exchange, was delisted due to financial difficulties and one year later, 
Idra Presse SpA entered the process of arrangement with its creditors. In 2004, the 
company was taken over by I2 Capital, a private-equity investment bank, a joint venture 
between Banca Intesa San Paolo SpA and Intek SpA. I2 Capital acknowledged the 
current undervaluation of Idra and decided to acquire it in order to reorganise and sell it 
in a couple of years for a profit. In the meantime, the whole production activities were 
leased to a new-born legal entity, named Idra Casting Machines srl, based in Milan. In the 
Summer of 2006, Idra Casting Machines conferred, through a reverse merger, all the 
know-how and of its operations to STP Presse srl, a former subsidiary, and became the 
holding company of the Group. Later on, STP Presse srl was renamed Idra srl. By the end 
of 2007, Idra srl was closing one of the best years since 2004. The restructuring of the 
company was completed; a new manufacturing plant has been inaugurated and the  
break-even reached. Prospects for the future were remarkably positive and the company 
was finally ready to conquer back its leading position within the Western markets after 
almost a decade of sacrifices and difficulties (interview with the Financial Controller). 
5.2 The acquirer 
L.K. Technology is a company engaged in the design, manufacturing and sale of  
die-casting machines, plastic injection moulding machines and computerised numerical 
controlled (CNC) machines. The Group was established in 1979 in Kwai Chung, in Hong 
Kong and started its expansion into Mainland China in 1991 with the opening of L.K. 
Machinery Co., Ltd., its first manufacturing plant in Shenzen. Nowadays, it owns 
manufacturing facilities in Shenzen, Zhongshan, Ningbo, Shangai, Fuxin and Kunshan in 
China, and in Taiwan and in Italy and it currently employs 4,000 employees all around 
the world (L.K. Technology Fact Sheet). In October 2006, L.K. Technology Holding Ltd. 
(558: HKG), was listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The Group obtained its first 
international certificate, the ISO 9001 in 1994 as well as several accreditations from BSI, 
in 1997. More than 100 acquired patents later, it has received several national awards and 
recognitions such as ‘China Top Brand’, ‘Hong Kong Top Brand’, ‘Machine 500 China’ 
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and ‘2013 Hong Kong Awards for Industries: Machinery and Machine to Old Design 
Award’. Its products are deployed in the automobile, household electrical appliances, 
building, aircraft and military industries. Nowadays, L.K. Technology is recognised as 
one of the largest die-casting machine manufacturers in the world and one of the five 
most influential manufacturers in China’s plastic injection moulding machines (interview 
with the Financial Controller). The majority of its production is concentrated in  
China and the Group mainly targets low-cost industries in emerging economies.  
When considering Western markets, such as Europe or the USA, L.K. Technology 
encountered significant difficulties in breaching the market supremacy of European 
players – customers in the European and the US market generally seek high quality 
performance machines, and tend not to consider price as their priority. When considering 
L.K. Technology’s path towards internationalisation, it is possible to identify two 
different phases (interview with key-informant F). The first one comprises the first two 
decades of operations when the management focused major efforts and resources towards 
the development of the manufacturing and sales network in Mainland China and in 
neighbouring countries such as Thailand, Taiwan and Japan. By early 2000s, the rapid 
development of the Chinese automobile, communication, motorcycle, machinery and 
electrical industries had led to significant rises in the demand for die-casting. Particularly 
in the categories of aluminium and magnesium die-casting machines, from 1995 to 2003, 
the average annual growth rates were of 11.95% and 35.45% respectively (The rapidly 
growing market of China’s Die Castings, 2007). In these circumstances, the second wave 
of internationalisation occurred. In 2006, to capture overseas markets, L.K. Technology 
incorporated a sales and service company in Delaware, USA, and in 2008 it acquired Idra 
srl, in Italy. Through these outposts the Group meant to establish a strong presence in the 
more profitable and difficult Western markets. Currently, the international strategy of 
L.K. Technology relies on a proprietary network of sales and service companies in China, 
Hong Kong, Thailand, Japan, Taiwan, India and Italy. In addition, LK Technology 
outsources the commercial and service operations to independent local dealers in Israel, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Turkey, Germany and Brazil. 
5.3 The acquisition 
When I2 invested in Idra Presse SpA after the delisting, the operation was not a long-term 
industrial investment but a financial one (interview with the Financial Controller). The 
objective of the private-equity fund was to exploit the potentials of a troubled company, 
currently undervalued by the market, restructure it and after a couple of years resell it for 
a profit. The screening for potential future acquirers started immediately after the 
acquisition. In 2004, among other interested parties, L.K. Technology established the first 
contacts. What made of Idra an attractive investment, according to the Financial 
Controller at Idra srl, was the fact that at that time “Idra had a very strong brand, 
knowledge of the industry at a global level, heritage and an excellent product. Moreover, 
in the industry, Idra was synonymous with long-lived product” (interview with the 
Financial Controller). Since 2004, the Hong Kong management was keeping an eye over 
a possible investment deal in Europe. There was Idra, a world-class player in the business 
and it was on the market for sale. L.K. Technology, at the time, was undergoing its 
second wave of international expansion. In 2006, the US greenfield investment 
represented a first attempt to conquer the Western markets, but still the brand was too 
weak and the competition too fierce. In the die-casting industry, due to the characteristics 
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of the product, customers were few and manufacturers even fewer, it was therefore 
significantly difficult to breach competitor’s hold on the market. When L.K. Technology 
realised that the sales forecasts in the USA were not enough to conquer the Western 
markets, the move towards Idra was made (interview with the Financial Controller). The 
acquisition of Idra was an appealing chance on the market. The Chinese company had a 
strong presence in the national market and significant knowledge of the industry, but it 
lacked a strong brand identity and a well-oiled international network. The acquisition 
would turn L.K. into the largest die-casting machines manufacturer in the world. 
Moreover, the two firms had some synergies that could be exploited – namely scale and 
production efficiency of the Chinese company and the strong brand name and global 
sales network of the Italian counterpart. However, according to the Financial Controller, 
an important driver for the acquisition was also the fondness that the CEO had towards 
the Italian firm. Using the automotive sector as a metaphor, the Financial Controller said 
that “Idra is what Ferrari is for the automotive industry. Imagine you are a Chinese car 
manufacturer and you discover that Ferrari is on sale. You have the resources to buy it 
and on the top you are a great fan of it. Would you buy it, would not you? Well, this is 
what happened to Idra and L.K. Technology” (interview with the Financial Controller). 
In the first months of 2008, during the last phases of due diligence, Idra reported the 
2007-year results – it was one of the best years since 2004. In that moment, Idra was a 
great deal, the firm had just undergone extensive restructuring, a new plant had just been 
inaugurated, break even had been reached and forecasts for 2009 were very promising. In 
April 2008, L.K. Technology announced that, through its indirect wholly owned 
subsidiary Honest Well Investment Limited, an agreement with Idra Casting Machines srl 
had been signed. L.K. Technology acquired a 70% stake of Idra srl. In addition, both L.K. 
Technology and Idra Casting Machines srl agreed to immediately fund Idra with 
€3,500,000 and €1,500,000 in cash, respectively. Additionally, the acquisition provided 
for the parties to enter into a call option agreement. In this way, L.K. Technology through 
Honest Well had the option to purchase the 50% of Idra Casting Machines’ quota in the 
first option period and the remaining 50% in the second option period. The acquisition of 
the remaining shares happened respectively in 2010 and 2011. This provision was taken 
with the aim of ensuring as much continuity as possible during the shift between the old 
and the new ownership. In the official L.K. bulletin the reasons for the acquisition were 
made public “the marriage of strengths of the two companies will allow them to fully 
realise their corresponding resources, professional talents and services, and expand their 
market shares in China and around the world” (L.K. Acquisition Bulletin, 2008). Due 
diligence reports, financial statements and commercial forecasts all looked positive for 
2009. 
5.4 The post-acquisition 
By the end of 2008, the first signs of the upcoming financial crisis appeared. Sales 
mirrored the uncertainty of the markets. Especially because of the decrease in 
investments for industrial machineries in the automobile industry, existing orders were 
cancelled and new orders were delayed. In 2009, Idra registered a loss of €6.5 million. 
L.K. Technology, as the main shareholder, helped considerably by continuing to 
financially support the subsidiary despite the loss. From the outset of the acquisition there 
was the deliberate intent of keeping L.K. Technology and Idra srl quite independent from 
one another. As stated in the official 2008 acquisition bulletin, the strategy was quite 
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clear: “L.K. Group will run the two brands independently, letting them shine under their 
unique charms, it will also strive to expand the coverage of both brands in China and in 
the world, thereby facilitate strong advances of its die-casting machine business” (L.K. 
Acquisition Bulletin, 2008). In order to better convey the rationale behind the separation 
of the brands and the autonomy of the Italian subsidiary, the Financial Controller again 
used a metaphor from the automobile industry: 
“We introduce ourselves in the markets as Idra srl, not L.K. Technology. The 
brands have two completely different targets. It is just like for Ferrari and Fiat. 
The purchasing experience, the after sales services and the commercial 
strategies are completely different. It is fundamental not to confuse the brands. 
Can you imagine a Ferrari getting around with the Fiat logo? It is important to 
keep the two entities separated in order not to confuse the final customer.” 
(interview with the Financial Controller) 
Therefore the Idra Group runs the manufacturing facility in Travagliato, Brescia (Italy) 
and manages the commercial and after sales outposts of Idra North America, Inc. (USA), 
Idra Pressen GmbH (Germany) and Idra China Ltd. Not only in the day-to-day 
management but also in the setting of the strategy, the Idra Group’s management team is 
completely autonomous. As stated several times by the Financial Controller, the 
commercial and the communication strategies of the two brands are radically different 
and merging them would only result in confusing the customers. Moreover, it was 
decided that in the Idra’s website, in the section dedicated to the company history there 
would be no references to any of the several restructuring operations and to the latest 
acquisition. This deliberate choice underscored the notion that no matter the name of the 
legal entity or its ownership, Idra’s values of innovation, quality, reliability and expertise 
have always remained unchanged since 1946. Within this context, the presence of the 
Chinese shareholder is generally not highlighted in any instance related to commercial 
activities, however, it becomes fundamental when considering the financial aspect of the 
activities (interview with key-informant E). During the last couple of years, Idra and 
other Italian companies, have been coping with the European market recession. Within 
this context, the Chinese investor has played a crucial role towards Idra’s recovery thanks 
to its solid financial position. The Financial Controller confirmed that when the 
interlocutors are banks, financial institutions, and shareholders, having the support of a 
solid partner such as L.K. Technology has helped convey a sense of reliability. The 
Chinese counterpart, in contrast with the marketing strategy implemented by Idra, 
proudly and publicly acknowledges its ownership of Idra, one of the most renowned 
brands in the industry. Owning the Idra brand has allowed L.K. Technology to widen its 
products range and to gain access to the European market. In addition, L.K. Technology 
has seized the opportunity to acquire Idra’s best practices and its R&D centre. L.K. 
Technology has conferred Idra’s General Manager with substantial decision making 
autonomy. Yet, the Italian subsidiary is called to fulfil budget requirements and achieve 
the prescribed performance standards. The Financial Controller confirmed that the 
majority of L.K. Technology’s cash efforts focus on Idra’s R&D department. Idra has a 
long tradition of excellence in all sorts of engineering activities, and L.K. Technology has 
been an excellent partner in understanding the importance of the R&D function to sustain 
the firm’s success (interview with key-informant A). As for other operations, the 
Financial Controller contends that they do not require any major investment since in the  
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Travagliato facility mainly focuses on assembly. The components are purchased from all 
over the world and Idra focuses on project design and manual assembly of the machines. 
Idra does not leverage L.K. Technology’s network in China to reach additional 
economies of scale. However, in the near future the Italian and the Chinese management 
are planning to start buying components together to obtain a lower price (interview with 
the Financial Controller). 
With respect to the post-acquisition phase, the Financial Controller underlined how 
the most delicate step that the Chinese ownership had to face was to appoint the right 
person to guide the Italian subsidiary. In the first years after the acquisition a transition 
manager covered the role, however, only in April 2009, L.K. Technology managed to 
finally identify in Mr. Ferrario as the most suitable General Manager. With an experience 
of over 30 years in the industry, he used to work in Teksid, EurAlcom Group and 
Meridian Technologies, and thanks to his deep knowledge of the product he has become 
a crucial asset for the Group. According to the Financial Controller one of the greatest 
asset was the fact that “before being a manager in Idra, he was one our customers. When 
you have to sell a machine is maybe better to know what the machine it is able to do 
rather than how the machine is made” (interview with the Financial Controller). So far, 
the acquisition and post-acquisition have run smoothly. In the last L.K. Technology 
Holding annual report (2013/2014), Idra has recorded revenues of HK$400,371,000 
(approx. €47 million) registering a slight decrease compared to the same period in the 
previous year. However, the Italian subsidiary is slowly recovering from the financial 
crisis and has started making profitable contributions to the L.K. Group (interview with 
key-informant D). 
5.5 The integration phase 
According to the Financial Controller, the integration phase between L.K. Technology 
and Idra has ran smoothly. Significantly the Chinese acquirer has not imposed any kind 
of cultural behaviour or somehow forced the blending of the two cultures. The acquisition 
strategy was meant to keep the headquarters and the subsidiary independent of each 
other; therefore the potential for organisational or cultural clashes has been quite low 
(interview with key-informant C). In addition, the two firms have often shared a common 
view on the strategy to be implemented (interview with the Financial Controller). For 
instance, when called to decide which department to upgrade, both the Chinese and the 
Italian management agreed on strengthening the R&D centre. The Financial Controller 
confirmed that very few contacts have occurred so far between the Italian and L.K. 
management. The more frequent interactions usually happen when the Chinese Financial 
Controller travels to Italy. Therefore, amongst Idra’s management executives there is not 
any perception of authoritarianism from the Chinese management. The company is well 
structured and the Italian General Manager has wide authority over the Idra and Idra’s 
subsidiaries. When asked if he has noticed peculiarities or distinctive elements of 
working in an Italian company acquired by a Chinese company, the Financial Controller 
took some time to think about it. The first things that he mentioned were linked to 
communication with his Chinese colleagues and their noticeable focus on short-term 
objectives. As for the communication issues, he said that the Chinese colleagues tend 
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“to be quite inscrutable. When you speak with an Italian or an European 
colleague you understand their body language, the looks he or she gives you. 
With the Chinese it is very different. You do not have a lot of feedback from 
them. I am not able to understand whether they are pleased or not with the 
information I am delivering to them. Moreover, sometimes they ask you to 
forward information but they do not come back to you to give you any 
feedback about the reason or the utility to them.” (interview with the Financial 
Controller). 
He also noticed a visible focus on the short-term objectives. He said that, when 
discussing budgets and objectives to be achieved, the main issue with someone used to 
working largely in emerging economies is that for them it is difficult to understand why 
results that are easily achievable in China are not so easy to be obtained in Europe. Since 
situations and circumstances are not comparable, the pressure from the top management 
to achieve results is not always very welcome. At the same time, the Financial Controller 
said that 
“I do think that this kind of pressure is not very different from the pressure that 
every subsidiary of a multinational would experience. The only difference is 
that in our case sometimes we have to spend time convincing the Headquarters 
that our performance has to be compared with other European companies and 
not with the Group subsidiaries in emerging markets.” (interview with the 
Financial Controller) 
Finally, the Financial Controller added that one peculiarity of L.K. Technology is that the 
company headquarters is located in Hong Kong but the company founder is Indonesian 
and a great percentage of managers holding top management positions obtained their 
university education in the USA or in Western countries. Therefore, according to the 
Financial Controller the company’s mentality tends to be quite advanced in comparison 
with other players from emerging countries. Generally speaking, with the exception of 
few cultural differences that are not perceived by the Financial Controller as very 
significant since Idra has always been kept quite independent from the L.K. management, 
the perception of the Chinese headquarters is very positive. As for the prejudice about 
lower quality that is often associated with Chinese production, the Financial Controller 
confirmed that such a prejudice was one of the cards played by competitors to smear 
Idra’s reputation in the European market. However, since the die-casting customers were 
very few and the relationship with them was almost on a familiar basis it was quite easy 
to overcome their initial fear about loosing Idra’s product quality. On the contrary, thanks 
to L.K. Technology’s cash infusions, Idra was able to better survive the recession and had 
better responsiveness and flexibility to handle demand volatility. As a result, in the last 
couple of years, Idra has recovered part of the previously lost market share and is now 
recovering back to the performance levels from before its delisting. As for the reaction of 
the Italian management and the employees to the news of the acquisition, there was 
surprise at the beginning, but most were happy that a serious player, with a solid financial 
position, and most importantly with a strong industrial plan to take Idra back to success, 
was making the acquisition. After almost five years of turnarounds, restructuring and 
layoffs, everyone was comforted by the arrival of L.K. Technology into the company 
(interview with the Financial Controller). 
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Table 4 The acquisition of Idra and its critical phases 
The acquisition Global competitors in the die-casting machine sector are few and 
customers are also few, especially in the premium segment. At the  
time of the acquisition, L.K. Technology, one of the biggest players in 
China and in other emerging countries, was seeking to penetrate the 
European market. However, the Chinese group lacked a global network 
and a strong brand. In these circumstances, Idra, one of the longest-
standing companies manufacturing die-casting machines, whose brand 
conveyed an idea of excellence, quality, heritage and reliability, was on 
sale. Motives for the acquisition were appealing: the Italian company 
had just undergone a restructuring, a new facility was just opened and 
the financial projections looked bright. Through the acquisition, L.K. 
Technology would have been able to acquire a strong brand, widen its 
product range and access a valuable portfolio of established customers. 
The post-acquisition In order to avoid any disruption during the acquisition and the  
post-acquisition phases, L.K. Technologies initially acquired only 70% 
of shares, and then in the following two years acquired the remaining 
30%. From the beginning, the strategy was to keep L.K. Technology 
separate from Idra. The Chinese company mainly played the role of a 
financial partner during the financial struggles due to the economic 
recession which was particularly harsh for European and Italian 
companies. From an organisational point of view, Idra remained 
organised as before the acquisition. The Chinese investments 
strengthened the R&D division and thus contributed to the success of 
the Italian brand. 
Conversely, L.K. Technology benefitted from holding Idra in its 
portfolio as it is a strong brand and LK Technology also seized the 
opportunity to acquire strategic competences from Idra. The 
fundamental step in the post-acquisition phase was the appointment of 
a new general manager, a veteran of the sector, to whom the 
headquarters granted wide autonomy. 
The integration phase In the Travagliato facility, the contacts among Chinese and Italian 
managers were few. During the first years after the acquisition, the 
majority of the contacts occurred between the financial controllers in 
China and Italy. Idra has an independent commercial strategy and a 
wide autonomy in the day-today management but it is required to 
match performance standards and fulfil prescribed budgets. Cultural 
clashes were not major issues within the integration phase since the 
autonomy and separation was wide. However, cultural differences 
emerged in the low propensity of Chinese managers to give feedback 
or shares information and in the pressure exerted by the Chinese 
managers for short-term results. 
5 Cross-case analysis 
The case-studies were drawn to better understand the strategic drivers behind the 
acquisitions of Italian manufacturing firms as well as the post-acquisition challenges and 
the integration strategies adopted by the Chinese firms. From the comparison of the two 
case-studies several similarities emerge. First, both Chinese companies at the time of the 
acquisitions, had affirmed themselves as top ranking players in their domestic and 
neighbouring markets and were looking at overseas opportunities to maintain high 
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growth rates and increase their market shares. Moreover, at the time of the acquisitions, 
both companies were not at their first overseas international experience. The motives for 
the acquisitions were, however, different. Haier acquired Meneghetti following a market-
seeking approach; unexpectedly the same product used to penetrate the European market 
became the most popular product in the domestic market. Differently, the acquisition of 
Idra srl by L.K. Technology Holding was the expression of asset-seeking approach where 
the Chinese company was looking to mainly acquire intangible assets such as a global 
brand and its heritage (interview with key-informant C). Additionally, when considering 
the timing of both the acquisitions, some interesting peculiarities emerge. Haier acquired 
Meneghetti in 2001, when Europe was still one of the most attractive markets. The Italian 
facility was sold to the Chinese acquirer when the Meneghetti family was forced to deal 
with the death of the founder and owner of the company, a very delicate issue in the life 
of a small-medium enterprise (interview with key-informant A). Idra was acquired in 
2007, a period when the economic recession was already eroding the spending 
capabilities of the European markets. The decision to acquire the company in this case 
was not driven by the need to enter a new market but was more linked to the idea of 
striking a convenient deal in the M&A market. At the time of the acquisition, the Italian 
company was suffering from financial distress. In both cases, the foreign company 
acquisition can be considered as a shortcut, and in the case of Idra also a convenient deal, 
to rapidly acquire competencies, strategic assets and market knowledge that it would 
have been too lengthy or impossible to build in-house (interview with key informant F). 
In both acquisitions, it was observed that one of the fundamental factors that acted as 
catalyst for the Chinese investor was the locational advantage of the company (interview 
with key informant A, B, D, F). Both target companies are embedded in two industrial 
districts. As such, they both provide a rich context characterised by a network of 
competences and a high concentration of intangible assets and mutually supporting 
relationships that can easily mitigate the liability of foreignness (Vecchi, 2008). For 
instance, when considering the case of Haier, the central northern area of Italy is one of 
the most important white goods industrial district in Europe. Similarly, the Brescia area 
hosts two out of the three leader companies in the die-casting machine sectors. In 
addition to the location advantages, it is important to emphasise how the manufacturing 
location becomes one of the fundamental factors when considering the brand entitlement 
to strategically use the Made in Italy label, whose appeal is particularly strong for 
emerging markets customers (interview with key-informant E). 
The benefits that the Chinese firms gained from the acquisitions of tangible and 
intangible assets are particularly interesting to investigate in each case. On the one hand, 
through the acquisition of Meneghetti, Haier managed to exploit the knowledge and the 
proximity to the European market to develop a line of goods targeting a more 
sophisticated customer base. Leveraging the synergies among the internal resources of 
the two entities, Haier managed to achieve cost efficiencies and economies of scale in the 
Italian manufacturing facility that allowed supporting the higher Italian labour costs. 
Additionally, the Made in Italy tag associated with the new product line allowed the 
company to place its product in a higher market segment. The different product 
positioning and the consequent higher profit margins achieved have increased the 
visibility of the brand and attracted new sales, especially in the USA and in emerging 
markets. On the other hand, in the Idra case, L.K. Technology took advantage of the 
visibility of a globally known brand both to broaden its brand portfolio and to get access 
to new distribution channels and sales networks. In addition, with the acquisition of one 
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of the oldest companies in the industry, L.K. Technology managed to acquire a 
production facility in Italy, an innovative R&D centre, a whole established network of 
customers and some experiential knowledge of the markets. 
In order to exploit the whole set of locational advantages, the Chinese companies 
maintained the identity of the Italian targets by avoiding the delocalisation of production 
in both acquisitions. The Italian identity of the target companies was strongly preserved 
mainly to strategically leverage the heritage and power of the Italian brands and secondly 
not to confuse the final customers. Crucial when considering the level of identity 
preserved in the post-acquisition phase is to observe the integration strategy adopted by 
both Chinese companies. In Haier, for instance, the integration was an ‘absorption 
strategy’ where the autonomy of the Italian subsidiary is low and the degree of 
dependency with the Qingdao headquarters is high. In Idra, on the other hand, the 
integration strategy implemented was a ‘preservation acquisition’ where the level of 
autonomy of the acquired firm is high and the strategic interdependencies quite  
low – there are no shared distribution channels, marketing campaigns, economies of scale 
between the target and the acquirer. Moreover, in the Idra case, it is evident how the 
Italian identity was strongly preserved, especially when considering the communication 
strategy implemented – in Idra’s website there are no references to the acquisition in 
2007 whereas in the L.K. Holding’s Chinese website the acquisition is widely publicised. 
In both acquisitions the presence of Chinese managers within the organisation was 
temporary, mainly during the post-acquisition period when in Haier a Chinese transition 
manager was appointed and in Idra a Chinese financial controller was in charge of the 
harmonisation of the accounting systems and of the overall control. The integration 
processes in the two cases were different. In the case of Haier, the integration process 
was long and difficult. At first, immediately after the acquisition, the daily routines and 
the union habits of the Italian facility caused conflicting situations with the Chinese 
transition manager. Later, when an experienced Italian manager was appointed, 
integration issues arose in the context of organisational relationships and internal 
communication, even though the Chinese management and the Italian one were not 
physically integrated in the same office. In this case, the tight contact between the two 
companies led to communication issues that emerged both due to different use of 
technical and managerial tools, different approaches to the concept of time, different 
notions of contract, the implicit denial and the tendency to always please the supervisor. 
In Idra’s experience, integration issues have concerned mostly the lack of feedback and 
participation in the decisional process for the subsidiary management. Both in Haier and 
in Idra a particular focus on efficiency and short-term results was pointed out by the 
interviewees, but this was not attributed to cultural differences but to relative lack of 
knowledge of the European market. In particular, it emerged that since the European 
market is still unknown to the headquarters they sometimes tend to compare their prior 
experience in other markets without taking into account the peculiarities of the European 
market. Interestingly in both acquisitions, the first reaction of the employees of the 
acquired firm to the news of the acquisition was very positive. Since at the time of the 
acquisitions both Italian companies were facing some delicate issues, namely the death of 
the founder/owner in the case of Meneghetti and some substantial lack of financial 
support in the case of Idra, a new foreign investor was welcomed as positive news. 
In both case-studies the positive expectations were not left unattended since both 
Chinese firms heavily invested in the acquired company. In Haier, for instance, the 
investments mainly regarded the product design of the 3D refrigerator, the launch of the 
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new product on the European market and the renewal of the whole production facility. In 
Idra the investments were aimed particularly at sustaining the delicate financial situation 
of the acquired company caused by the economic recession. However, additional 
resources were devoted to the R&D department, which was duly acknowledged as the 
core activity for the company’s ultimate success. Finally, in both case-studies the 
presence of a Chinese investor provided a strategic advantage against the competitors, 
especially the European ones, since the presence of a solid Chinese investor facilitated 
access to bank credit lines and the achievement of economies of scale. Moreover, having 
a Chinese investor meant that the Italian companies could have the opportunity to obtain 
access to the difficult but very large Chinese market via a privileged path, since they can 
capitalise on their headquarters’ domestic market knowledge, their distribution channels 
and their networks. 
6 Conclusions 
The study contributes in many ways. First it confirms a number of claims made in the 
literature on emerging economy firm internationalisation. Second, it identifies certain 
nuances that are easily missed in broad theoretical studies. Third, it raises some 
interesting points for further research. 
The study, through in-depth case studies, confirms a number of claims made in 
theoretical studies of emerging economy firm international expansion, particularly into 
advanced economies. Specifically, the Chinese firms in both case studies confirm the 
expectation in Luo and Tung (2007) and in Chari (2013) that emerging economy firms 
that have secured their position in their home markets are the ones more likely to 
internationalise to upgrade their competitiveness. Both Haier and L.K. Technology, as 
reviewed in the case studies, were well established in their home market and nearby 
markets before they sought to acquire the Italian firms. Both case studies also confirm 
arguments in the literature that emerging economy firms seek strategic assets such as 
brands and higher technology in their acquisitions of advanced economy firms (Luo and 
Tung, 2007). 
The in-depth case studies also highlight some nuances not easily seen in broad 
theoretical studies, and raise some interesting research questions for the future. For 
example, the case studies show that the acquisition of an advanced economy firm’s brand 
by an emerging economy firm must be managed carefully in the advanced economy 
markets, since the low cost image of the emerging economy firm’s products can erode the 
value of the advanced economy target’s brand. This is a nuance that is important but not 
appreciated widely in the extant literature. The case studies for example showed how 
Italian and other European customers were concerned about the brand value of the Italian 
firm deteriorating after its purchase by Chinese firms, and how some competitors even 
tried to use the acquisition to raise doubts in the minds of consumers. The case studies 
also show that the erosion of brand image can be prevented, for example by carefully 
separating the brand identities of the advanced economy target firm from that of the 
emerging economy acquiring firm through marketing, communication, and even the 
separation of the advanced economy operations from the emerging economy operations. 
The separation of organisations raises an important and interesting research question. 
Specifically, since emerging economy firms acquire advanced economy firms at least in 
part to acquire their advanced capabilities, how do emerging economy firms acquire the 
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capabilities while keeping the two organisations separate since a close or joint working 
relationship is important for the transmission of tacit capabilities (Chari, 2015). 
The case studies also showed that despite the substantial autonomy granted to the 
target firm, there were communication and coordination issues stemming from cultural 
differences. The theoretical literature assumes that when the headquarters and target are 
not tightly integrated such issues do not arise. This clearly was not the case in the case 
studies, as the Italian managers felt that the Chinese managers were driven more by short 
term results and set standards without an appreciation for the European market 
conditions. Similarly, when an Italian General Manager wanted to travel to the 
headquarters he could not get a firm yes or otherwise for his plans. The in-depth case 
studies thus highlight nuances that are glossed over in broad theoretical classifications of 
what to expect with different types of integration strategies. Here too more research on 
the types of communication and coordination problems faced when advanced economy 
target firms are allowed to operate largely autonomously, and the identification of 
strategies used to successfully address these problems, will help. 
Finally, while confirming claims in the literature that emerging economy firms seek 
advanced capabilities and brands when acquiring advanced economy firms, the case 
studies also highlight a nuance. That is, advanced capabilities and brand image are often 
tied to locations and hence emerging economy firms that acquire advanced economy 
targets for their strategic assets are unlikely to delocalise their production out of the target 
country. Even so, there may be economies of scale to be realised by sharing some 
production or procurement activities. Further research can shed light on how emerging 
economy acquirers of advanced economy target firms balance the need to retain 
production in the advanced economy with the potential for scale economies from 
consolidating production in lower cost locations. 
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